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ABSTRACT 
Noble cause corruption occurs when a person tries to produce a just outcome through unjust 
methods, for example, police manipulating evidence to ensure a conviction of a known offender. 
Normal integrity regime initiatives are unlikely to halt noble cause corruption as its basis lies in 
an attempt to do good by compensating for the apparent flaws in an unjust system. This paper 
explored the nature of noble cause corruption using statements and evidence given by police 
officers in the Wood Royal Commission (1994-1997). The overall findings are that officers 
involved in corrupt practices suffered from a failure of leadership and from a lack of inclusion. 
Officers were motivated to indulge in noble cause corruption through a desire to produce 
convictions where they believed the system unfairly worked against their ability to do their job 
correctly. This perception was supported by a culture of exclusion, which depicted police as a 
victimised group which was stigmatised and oppressed by the judicial system and the 
community.To deter police from engaging in noble cause corruption, strong leadership, better 
equipment and long-term incentives are suggested to minimise this type of behaviour within the 
police organization. 
Keywords: leadership; moral distance; moral hazard; noble cause corruption; Wood Royal 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Police are an essential part of the public service and are the frontline actors in keeping the peace and 
facilitating social stability and community cohesion. A career in policing is not for everyone and it is not as easy as 
protecting the innocent and keeping the „bad guys‟ off the streets. It is a career that requires police to take on a 
number of roles and responsibilities, such as enforcing the law, solving crimes, educating the public and generally 
making us feel safe and protected. Some of these roles however can be challenging and conflicting at times. On the 
one hand, police are agents of the state that are bounded by strict procedures and policies (and some argue an 
impossible mandate)(Manning, 1978)and on the other hand, they are morally committed to the „good end‟(Crank, 
Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2007, p. 103). These roles can be conflicting because the policies and procedures in place 
to protect officers and the public can obstruct an officer from obtaining this good end(Caldero & Crank, 2011; 
DeLattre, 2006; Muir, 1977). Sometimes, circumstances arise when good officers execute their duties in a manner 
that sets aside the normal / operational policies and procedures that their profession legally demands(Martinelli, 
2006). Such circumstance force officers to confront the noble cause corruption dilemma of breaching fundamental 
laws in order to serve the greater good (Harrison, 1999). 
Bending the rules for the greater good, under certain circumstances, can be viewed by officers as part of 
their job description, rather than misconduct or corruption (Pollock, 2007). Unlike monetary corruption, noble cause 
is often perceived as a positive act by the perpetrators and is seen to benefit society as a whole. Officers rationalize 
their „ends justifies the means‟ behaviour by; denying the criminality of their actions and recasting their actions in a 
more favourable light(Caldero & Crank, 2011; Crank et al., 2007). Part of the motivation comes from „perceived‟ 
injustice and incompetence in the judicial system(Skolnick, 1994). In other words, noble cause corruption lies within 
the values ofthe individual officer(Crank & Caldero, 2000). However, as its basis exists within an attempt to do 
good by compensating for the apparent flaws in an unjust system, measures used to prevent other types of 
corruption, such as penalties, investigations and procedural change are unlikely to halt noble cause corruption from 
occurring.  
Similarly, detecting this type of corruption can be challenging for supervisors because it appears to be 
„good police work‟ (e.g. arresting drug dealers, recovering stolen vehicles, obtaining confessions from 
criminals…etc.). Fellow officers are also unlikely to report its existence. It is the culture of police to support a „code 
of silence‟. This code has a significant influence on an officer‟s willingness to report misconduct by their fellow 
officers (Cockcroft, 2013). Police organizations also have a strong reluctance to discuss corruption in their 
organization and in an effort to keep the scandal out of the media(Ivkovic, 2003). Police leaders may implement a 
number of strategies to reduce the effect it can have on the organization by; sweeping corruption under the rug, 
denying its existence for as long as possible, or to publicly accuse particular individuals (to signal to the public there 
are only „a few bad apples‟)(Punch, 2009). Ultimately, the behaviour of these offending officers are perceived 
almost exclusively as detrimental signs of a public organization‟s lack of integrity (Ivkovic, 2003, p. 597) and can 
result in the loss of trust in the police by the public(Goldsmith, 2005; Kääriäinen, 2007; Mattes, 2006; Semukhina & 
Reynolds, 2014; Tankebe, 2010). Researchers are therefore limited to collecting open source information on the 
incidence of corruption within a policing organization, thus significantly limiting informed commentary on the 
topic. 
Apart from the empirical assessments ofCrank et al. (2007) and Porter and Warrender (2009), much of the 
discussion surrounding noble cause corruption has been policy-oriented (Punch, 2000) or philosophical (DeLattre, 
2006; Kleinig, 2002) in nature. This paper will make a meaningful contribution to the literature by providing 
insights into the nature of noble cause corruption and provides an analysis of the role of leadership and how it can be 
used as an instrument for prevention. This paper analyses evidence derived from statements and evidence provided 
by police officers called before the Wood Royal Commission (1994-1997). It also examines their participation in 
noble cause corruption activities and their rationalization of this behaviour. The Royal Commission into the New 
South Wales Police (also known as the Wood Royal Commission) investigated police corruption in NSW from 1994 
to 1997. Justice James Wood, the Royal Commissioner, confirmed that there were significant levels of corruption 
among NSW officers such as, high-level organized protection, fabrication of evidence, assaults on suspects, 
extensive fraud and serious neglect by officers(Wood, 1997). 
The paper commences with a discussion of police corruption, particularly the different types of police 
corruption. It outlines some of the characteristics of police culture and how it contributes to police corruption. It also 
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examines the role of leadership and the importance of positive role models and dispersed leadership in combating 
corruption. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion on possible solutions to combat police corruption. 
 
TYPES OF POLICE CORRUPTION 
Police are more subject to corruption because they operate in an environment that offers both temptation 
and opportunity. In order to function efficiently, police are granted vast discretionary power which is necessary to 
react immediately to situations and make quick decisions(Kappeler, Slunder, & Alpert, 1994; Mastrofski, 2004). In 
particular, police jobs that involve a high degree of discretion aremore likely to be exposed to corruption (e.g. they 
have the ability to enforce or ignore the law)(Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). 
Also, opportunities to enact deviance vary depending on the organizational structure, with some officers having 
more power than others (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 49).  By their nature, most police duties have many opportunities 
to accept bribes to make particular decisions, which assist crimes or criminals.  
According to the literature, police corruption falls into two main categories: grass-eatingsuch as accepting 
free, inexpensive privileges such as accepting free coffee or free meals; ormeat-eatingwhich covers all forms of graft 
recognised by mainstream society, including bribes from criminals (Armstrong, 2012; Knapp, 1972; Punch, 2009, 
p.29). These categories can range from occupational deviance, when rules are bent to an employee‟s advantage and 
at the expense of the organization, such as theft at the workplace, to crimes committed by police officers(Punch, 
2009). Noble cause corruption,also known as process corruption; refers to the manipulation of the justice system, 
usually to ensure a conviction(Australian Government, 2002; Caless, 2008). Such a process however, subverts the 
justice system by removing the opportunity for a fair trial and relying on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the 
basis of guilt.   
There is a history of this type of corruption, referred colloquially as verballing, which is a frequently 
applied mechanism and is common across Australia. Lucas (1977) explains:  
“some, we are sure, would not “verbal”, in any circumstances; some would, but only as the result of 
considerable provocation and with an absolute conviction that the person is guilty; but some do 
“verbal” persistently and without conscience (Lucas, 1977, p. 15). 
The use of verballing can be the result of moral distance between the officer and the suspect. Moral 
distance has two components: the punishment justification that is showing the person is guilty of a 
punishable/vengeful act, and the legal affirmation that is affirming the legitimacy of your own cause in acting 
against them(Grossman, 1995, p. 165-167). This position psychologically allows an officer to justify unethical acts 
such as stitching up or verballing on the basis that the accused is guilty and deserves to be punished(Chan, Devery, 
& Doran, 2003). Police can have a tendency to see themselves as the „white hats‟ or good guys as opposed to the 
„black hats‟ in the community. While this is literally true, there is a danger that entire groups, rather than offending 
individuals, are depicted as “malicious, alien forces intruding on the world of well-meaning, unsuspecting, virtuous 
people” (Baumeister, 1997, p.89). 
 
POLICE CULTURE 
Organizational culture is unique to a particular establishment and can be a powerful determinant of 
individual and group behaviour(Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985). There is a distinctive police culture driven by 
the nature of police work (Chan, 1999, p.136)with positive outcomes thatcan assist the functioning, survival and 
security among officers; and negative outcomes that allow corruption to flourish and facilitate the protection of 
wrongdoers from prosecution (Chan, 1999). Police culture can thus be defined as a: “mix of informal prejudges, 
values, attitudes and working practices commonly found among the lower ranks of the police that influences the 
exercise of discretion. It also refers to the police‟s solidarity, which may tolerate corruption and resist reform” 
(Waddington, 2008, p.203). This culture of solidarity and brotherhood by police officers in further supported in 
Cockcroft (2013, p.110), who also highlights Waddington (1999) contention that police culture is essentially two 
cultures consisting of an operational culture (which relates to how police officers behave, and an oral culture (which 
relates to how they explain their actions). 
Police work is dangerous and the officers are often unpopular and can be stigmatized by society and 
criticized for any real or perceived excessive action they take. Police duties and the view of police by the general 
public can contribute to solidarity and isolation (Reiner, 2010). Police officers can also encounter difficulty in 
forging and maintaining relationships with individuals who belong to occupations outside the police organization 
(Skolnick, 1994). This mind-set can create a subculture setting where police isolate themselves apart from society 
with a group-think, „us v. them‟ attitude (Sewell, 1999, p. 156). Officers develop strong bonds of loyalty, also 
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known as the „police brotherhood‟, where officers backup one another (Punch, 2009, Cockcroft, 2013). This type of 
attitude often starts with graduation from the police academy and is continuously enforced throughout a police 
officer‟s career.  
When a person becomes part of the police brotherhood, individuals usually take on the beliefs and values of 
the group. This is reinforced by the natural desire to be liked (Brown & Abrams, 2003) and not to cause social 
friction (Coady & Bloch, 1996). Group members emulate the ethics of their peers and prefer them, even over those 
of direct authority figures (Granitz & Ward, 2001). Consequently, a person feels he will „join in‟ and act unethically 
rather than letting his friends or supervisors down (Beck, 1999, p.145; Grossman, 1995, p.153; Weber, Kurke, & 
Pentico, 2003). This drive to put the in-group‟s values and ideologies above all others clearly paves the way for 
collective corruption (Ashford & Anand, 2003, p.10).  
The problem with this attitude is that when a conflict arises where the officer is faced with a choice 
between what is ethically right and their loyalty to their police brotherhood. Corrupt conduct can be perpetuated 
when a pattern of such behaviour becomes ingrained in a police pattern of socialization (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 
50).For example, when accepting small gratitude‟s (e.g., free food or coffee) can be seen as a test of loyalty(Lauchs 
& Staines, 2012). This group support for rule violations provides the conduct with a backbone or foundation for 
future corruption(Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 52). This behaviour can then become normalized as it is internalized by 
fellow officers as permissible and passed on to new recruits or the next generation of members (Brief, Buttram, & 
Dukerich, 2001; Zucker, 1977).  
 
LEADERSHIP 
Leadership plays a significant role in police work but it is not solely defined by rank. Instead, all officers 
convey some leadership skills because they operate in an environment where they are not under direct supervision. 
Leadership displayed by senior police officers can therefore impact on the amount, level and acceptance of corrupt 
practices. Specifically, Kramer and Tyler (1996)identified two key factors with regards to leadership and corruption. 
First, the more charismatic the authority figure is, the more likely subordinates will identify with them and trust that 
authority figure. Second, the processes and structures put in place by organizations can often insulate senior 
managers from blame and/or liability and further support corruption (Ashford & Anand, 2003). This highlights the 
potential for police to engage in corrupt activities.  
So profound is the impact of police leadership on the level of corruption within an organization that, as 
Keane & Bell (2013) argue that: 
“… serious misconduct by senior police leaders can negatively impact the public‟s trust in the police 
in two ways: firstly, by failing to meet the more obvious expectations of leading by example, 
misconduct by police leaders are likely to bring institutional damage to the police4 (Holmes, 2010). 
Secondly, by the nature of any misconduct which appears to attack those whom they are tasked with 
protecting, police leaders may project a negative organizational image with more sinister overtones 
(Aplert& Noble, 2009, p.8)”. 
 
Leaders do not have to engage in corrupt activities themselves to serve as role models (e.g., ignoring or rewarding 
corruption) and can often send a clear signal to subordinates, whether intentionally or not (Ashford &Anand, 2003). 
Police may perform unethical acts through the direction of a superior, to emulate the actions of a respected person of 
higher rank, so they do not endanger the opportunity for promotion. It is more likely that an officer will comply if 
the superior is able to observe whether compliance occurs. The superior may also obtain compliance by providing 
absolution for misdeeds, that is, the superior says that he or she alone will wear responsibility for actions performed 
by the actor (Bauman, 1989, p.21-22). Nonetheless, some officers will still comply out of respect. For example, 
Milgram‟s (1974)obedience experiments showed that most people find it difficult to disobey orders even when they 
do not agree with them (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992). This inclination to obey has been affected by many aspects: we 
are told to follow orders and rules through social education; the officer has to make a decision between a possible 
wrong action and an actual wrong disobedience. The choice is difficult but obedience is more likely;especially as 
most people do not like to second-guess superiors. They assume that the superior has all the facts whereas the actor 
has only their narrow perspective(Baumeister, 1997, p.267-268). 
 
MORAL HAZARD 
Moral hazard is fundamental to the state given that its laws can only be enforced by appropriate actions 
from state officials and agents, such as police officers (Myerson, 2011, p. 4). As the government is a network made 
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up of agents, on various levels, holding different levels of power, government agents have the opportunity to abuse 
their power (Myerson, 2011). In order for police officers to be more inclined to behave in a manner that is consistent 
with the government and society‟s expectations, long-term rewards for serving the state, called moral hazardrents(as 
incentives for not abusing their power) must outweigh the benefits gained from engaging in corrupt 
activities(Myerson, 2011). This is referred to as the moral hazard problem and is defined as: “the problem of 
creating incentives for agents to behave in some prescribed manner when their behaviour cannot be directly 
observed by others” (Myerson, 2011, p. 2). 
A police officer‟s incentives or rewards, depends on the judgements of their superiors andtherefore, the 
incentives will depend on the top leaders in the organization (Myerson, 2011). Some officers have been more 
inclined to escalate their career prospects by engaging in corrupt acts, such as falsifying evidence, accepting bribes 
or planting fake evidence in order to get a conviction in the hope that they will be rewarded by their superiors. Thus, 
there is a moral hazard problem at the top leadership as agents must trust that their superiors will judge their 
performance in a positive manner and will reward them accordingly. Alchianand Demsetz(1972)recognised a similar 
problem in the private sector and called this „the metering problem in firms‟. Therefore, organizations must promise 
and provide rewards to its agents as well as trust that the organization will implement the terms properly.  
The existence of noble cause corruption is proof of the efficacy of the moral hazard problem in policing, 
but it does not ensure that the problem is addressed. Integrity systems are not always effective against corruption. 
Becker and Stinger (1974, p. 3) identify that the level of enforcement will depend on a variety of factors: 
 
a) is the degree of honesty of the enforcers; thus the police who investigate the police may participate in the 
same corruption. Also, some otherwise honest enforcers will condone the noble cause corruption; 
b) is the structure of incentives to honesty; the practice will continue if the perpetrators obtain greater rewards 
from the corrupt act than the investigators do from successful investigation;  
c) the frequency and visibility of the violation; it is harder to detect if it does not happen most of the time in a 
regular pattern; and  
d) crimes, such as bribery, that do not produce an aggrieved victim are harder to detect. Noble cause 
corruption does produce an aggrieved victim but they may not complain. 
 
Given that noble cause corruption will be hard to detect, and therefore difficult to stop through integrity 
regimes, a solution needs to be found that relies on incentives. The aim of this paper is to understand why corruption 
is pervasive, how it occurs and the role of leadership as a mechanism for prevention.  
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Data was obtained from the transcripts of hearings of the Wood Royal Commission(The Royal 
Commission into the New South Wales Police, 1995).The transcripts include testimony of officers who had agreed 
to cooperate with the Inquiry and discuss their corrupt behaviour. This study has concentrated on the testimony of 
five (5) officers who worked in and around Kings Cross, Sydney to ensure that there is some uniformity of 
background in the evidence. The NSW Police Officers; Haken, Demol, Pentland, Swan and Scullion all provided 
evidence of their involvement in activities surrounding noble cause corruption. The study also concentrates on their 
admissions in relation to the types of noble cause corruption in which they participated and the rationalizations of 
that corruption they provided to the Inquiry.  
Applying a grounded theoretic approach, the first reading of the material was undertaken without 
preconceptions to allow for unanticipated material emerging from the data(Noaks & Wincup, 2004). The coding 
process included developing sensitising concepts derived from the literature to direct the classification of material 
(Patton, 2002). Next open coding was conducted to identify new issues that did not appear in the existing literature 
(Noaks & Wincup, 2004), otherwise known as testing emergent themes(Marshall & Rossman, 2011).For example, 
justifications appeared which related to the reliability of investigations and technical resourcing; issues which did 
not appear in the literature. Similar justifications appeared in more than one of the testimonies and where given the 
same new code. Finally the material was collated into groups to formulate arguments and theories concerning the 
general is ability of findings.  
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FINDINGS 
Analysis of the NSW officers evidence in the Wood Royal Commission suggests that there was a wide 
range of noble cause corruption and this corrupt activity took place at three stages: arrest, interview and when giving 
evidence in court. Each of the practices mentioned below were related by the witnesses to rationalizations provided 
in the next section.  
 
Arrest: Phase 1 
Some officers who could not obtain evidence for a charge would give drug dealers a “stern talking to” to 
show them that the police were “in charge of the street” (Pentland, p. 10401)1. They also participated in harassment, 
such as following a known drug dealer everywhere three steps behind, so they could not operate, with the intention 
of forcing them to leave the area: 
“It was – yes only if they‟d swallowed the caps on us or if we‟d turned them over a couple of times during 
the shift and we just got sick of them and there was nothing on. It was just Howard‟s and my sense of 
humour. It was probably not a bad policing technique, I suppose, get them out of the area” (Pentland, p. 
10498). 
 
Others would get around the lack of evidence by loading up, that is, placing drugs back on a dealer so that 
charges could be laid. Haken preferred to say that “...evidence was manipulated to achieve certain ends... merely a 
return of certain property to the possession of the person who had previously had it” (Haken, p. 11935).Police would 
also load up a person with drugs to increase the severity of a charge: 
 
“The ambition was to make the matter more serious in the eyes of the court and to make it apparent on the 
street that he had overstepped the mark, to take him down a peg or two...” (Haken, p. 12010). 
 
Alternatively, police would change evidence to a lesser charge as a trade-off for information or to cultivate an 
informer (Scullion, p. 9959).  
 
Interview: Phase 2 
Police are required to issue a judges caution to an accused before commencing a record of interview. 
However, police knew that if they gave a judges caution, then the accused would refuse to answer any questions, 
and in the 1970s and early „80s, “you were looked upon as a fool if you actually cautioned someone” (Scullion, p. 
9901).Consequently, police would retrospectively claim that a caution was given.  This practice was prevented with 
the introduction of the requirement to electronically record interviews (Scullion 9960). However, even then, police 
would still have a preamble conversation with an accused to induce them to make a confession, even though this 
would render the confession inadmissible (Scullion, p. 9900). Verballing was also used but not as the sole evidence 
against an accused: “… but with those verbal admission, there‟s also circumstantial evidence that accompanies that 
admission, which includes sometimes photographs at the banks, firearms, shoes” (Swan, p. 9786).Some police also 
extorted money from known criminals who paid to ensure they would not be arrested and verballed (Haken, p. 
14280). 
 
Giving Evidence in Court: Phase 3 
A fundamental rule of court proceedings is that witnesses not discuss their evidence with other persons in 
order to ensure that their testimony was not compromised. The witnesses stated under oath that most police shared 
information amongst the witnesses before a trial- both police and civilian. They did this in three ways. First, some 
said that they were simply tryingto cover gaps in their story, not invent new evidence – “I don‟t think it was a matter 
of working out false evidence. You have to look through the brief and you check it out and say, „Oh, we are missing 
something here” (Demol, p. 9736).Alternatively, it was used to fix up sloppy cases (Demol, p. 9739). Interestingly 
one of Demol‟s complaints was that defence witnesses always did this (Demol, p. 9685). Others said that these 
scrum-downs were designed to refresh memory not invent new evidence – “there wasn‟t anything sinister in that” 
(Scullion, p. 9890). 
                                                 
1
 All references in this section refer to The Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police (1995) and provide 
the witness‟ name and the page reference.  
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A. … everybody discussed the case before it and you read through the statement to refresh your 
memories to give evidence. You were involved in that many matters, you know, you‟ve got to 
refresh your memory somewhere. Most of the briefs are usually finished within three or four days 
of arrest… 
Q.  So there was no adding to statements and change statements? 
A. No.(Demol, p. 9743) 
However, they were aware that this practice was illicit and were told to never admit they had done it (Scullion, p. 
9891). 
Second, police incorporated material from civilian‟s evidence into their own. This was because civilian 
witnesses were unreliable; they may not tell the same story as their original evidence or even show up to court.  
A. So if you had information from a civilian about what they‟d heard or what they‟d seen, you might 
try to incorporate that into your evidence. 
Q. Either in the form of a verbal admission or by substituting yourself for the witness? 
A.  Basically, yes. 
Q. That kept the briefs smaller and more manageable? 
A.  Yes… 
Q.  I imagine that, on these occasions, you might be somewhat fortified by doing this in the knowledge 
that, „Well, at least the civilian said he saw or heard this, so it‟s not as though I‟m making all this 
up; I‟m just delivering the evidence that would otherwise be given by them‟? 
A. That‟s correct. (Scullion, p. 9892) 
 
Third, the primary investigating officer prepared statements for junior officers as a means of saving time 
(Haken, p. 14417). 
The final type of noble cause corruption was designed to protect police from investigations by Internal 
Affairs (IA), the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) or the Wood Royal Commission. They 
would always tell other police when they are under investigation (Demol, p. 9685; Scullion, p. 9949). They would 
advise the officer that there was a “Whale in the Bay”, in other words, there was an investigation into that officer‟s 
actions (Haken, p. 14323). 
 
REASONS FOR CORRUPTION 
As discussed above, the NSW Police Service had a distinct culture and saw themselves in an „us versus 
them‟ situation(Chan, 1996; Sewell, 1999). This perception was enacted in a number of ways. Any agencies which 
investigated police were „the enemy‟. As Demol states: “Yes, it‟s like the enemy. Internal Affairs, Internal Security, 
The Royal Commission, ICAC – they‟re all the enemy” (Demol, p. 9671).Police referred to a need to „cover your 
arse‟ in the sense of covering themselves from inquiries into their behaviour by units such as Internal Affairs (IA) 
(Demol, p. 9579).Demol regarded it as a “built-in thing” in the police force (Demol, p. 9700). The need to „cover 
your arse‟ was taught at the academy but from the perspective of „do nothing wrong.‟ Officers twisted this reasoning 
by extending it to providing protection from investigation – “cover your tracks” (Demol 9760). 
In addition to this was the need to respect the code of silence. Haken said he would not break the code even 
when he saw some activities that he regarded as wrong (Haken, p. 14270).This said, there were always a small 
minority who did not participate in noble cause corruption and these actions had to be kept secret from them 
(Demol, p. 9739; Scullion, p. 9901; Haken, p. 11817). Allofficers involvedin the corrupt practices mentioned that if 
they did not support such efforts, they would have been ostracised (Demol, p. 9587; Swan, p. 9786; Scullion, p. 
9889).  
The witnesses stated that there was no faith in the judicial system, which was regarded as a “joke” (Demol, 
p. 9685). The rules of evidence were too toughand penalties were too weak (Demol 9711). Still police claimed that 
they only used noble cause corruption on minor matters and very rarely on a matter that would lead to imprisonment 
for terms of less than 12 months (Demol, p. 9741). It was usually used in drug supply matters as there were no 
independent witnesses (Demol, p. 9743).Demol said that when he worked at the NSW-DEA he did not need to 
falsify evidence as that section had the resources “... like listening devices, telephone intercepts, undercover 
operatives, video surveillance...” (Demol, p. 9743). Likewise, Scullion (p. 9902) said that these techniques were less 
necessary with the introduction of better forensic methods. 
Police learnt the heuristics of noble cause corruption by copying the actions of their peers. They were not 
instructed on how to behave, but followed the example of more senior officers (Demol, p. 9633; Scullion, p. 9893; 
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Haken, p. 14270). All these practices were passed down to an officer on joining the force and then passed on by him 
to the next generations as standard procedure (Scullion, p. 9961). For example, a „scrum down‟ was regarded as a 
normal part of preparing for a case to ensure justice was done (Scullion, p. 9893). Haken had no issue with perjury 
when it was necessary and he saw this as normal practice (Haken, p. 14288). Having good evidence was not always 
guaranteed to get a conviction (Swan, p. 9787). Police justified manipulation of evidence or verballing by saying it 
was only done to criminals who were guilty (Demol, p. 9684; Scullion, p. 9894) or to “lock up an active drug dealer 
who couldn‟t be locked up legitimately” (Haken, p. 11821). They also believed that no one trusted police testimony 
(Demol, p. 9684). “It‟s a common sort of belief that you‟ve got to do what you can to get a conviction, because you 
won‟t get it, because no-one believes you, a jury won‟t believe you, judges won‟t believe you” (Demol, p. 9685). 
Ironically, they also believed that the majority of the public (the “good people”) were behind them and that the 
courts accepted noble cause corruption. “The actions of the police was certainly accepted by the courts and it was 
my belief that that was not accepted blindly on a lot of occasions” (Haken, p. 14278). 
Noble cause behaviour was not constant and all police saw themselves as working hard and producing 
otherwise honest work. (Demol, p. 9631; Haken, pp. 11871 & 11935 & 14262 & 14311). The witnesses stated 
thatthe majority of the evidence given was entirely proper and swearing false evidence was a rare occurrence 
(Demol, p. 9739; Haken, p. 11821). They took great pride in their work and obtained job satisfaction (Demol, p. 
9633; Haken, p. 14275). There was no attempt to try and reconcile the two attitudes; they did not see themselves as 
working in a contradictory manner (Demol, p. 9711). “I don‟t know that I reconciled – the situation was in existence 
and that‟s just the way it was” (Haken, p. 14292).They stated their actions were necessary to do their job. “I 
considered it to be quite acceptable behaviour in the normal course of being a detective and there appeared to me to 
be nothing out of the normal course of activity” (Haken, p. 11815).Hakenwas concerned about getting caught by 
Internal Affairs but knew the chance was slim due to the „code of silence‟. 
Those involved also reversed the situation to paint themselves as victims. They claimed that criminals used 
the same techniques: “Sir, with verbal evidence, people, or offenders, there are other times – what I‟m trying to say 
is that they are making the excuse they were verballed, where there is something else to suggest that they, in fact, 
committed the crime” (Swan 9788). Similarly, the integrity services used the techniques on police. Pentland (p. 
10467) claimed that IA arrested him in front of a detectives‟ class on a training course; put him through five hours of 
intimidation before the commencement of an interview; threatened him and made false claims that they found drugs 
in his locker, and then verballed him. “I haven‟t treated an offender or an alleged offender as I was treated [by IA]” 
(Pentland, p. 10470).He was offended that this was done to him by police officers that he thought where “like one of 
us” (Pentland, p. 10471).Haken viewed IA as hypocrites; officers he knew had participated in corrupt activity 
transferred there, as it was seen as a career path with rapid promotion (Haken, p. 14322). Warning of a „Whale in the 
Bay‟ was not seen as corrupt and almost all officers would give the warning as part of the extension of the 'us vs. 
them' attitude (Haken, p. 14234). The culture of the police force and connections across units allowed them to know 
about every pending or active inquiry. “The basis of those organizations in so far as mateship or the culture was 
that they leaked like sieves and any information that was being sought by those organizations was readily available 
to people who were involved” (Haken, p. 14326). 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to understand why noble cause corruption is so pervasive, how it occurs and the potential 
role of leadership as a mechanism for prevention.The outcome of this examination suggests that NSW officers 
suffered from a failure (or absence) of affirmative and positive ethical leadership and from a lack of inclusion. The 
witnesses believed that they were being ostracised from the same community they were protecting. This disconnect 
took three forms: 
a) a lack of support to do their job properly due to inadequate laws of evidence; 
b) being undermined by the courts who would often undo their good work; and  
c) receiving worse treatment through noble cause corruption by the integrity services -hypocrisy. 
The findings also suggest that officers were motivated to engage in noble cause corruption through a desire 
to produce convictions where they believed the system unfairly worked against them. This perception was supported 
by a culture of exclusion, which depicted police as a victimized group which was stigmatised and oppressed by the 
judicial system and the community. It is clear that noble cause corruption is directly related to a desire to perform 
their job correctly, that is, the arrest and conviction of criminals. While the officers who gave evidence also 
participated in monetary corruption, they all also noted that other officers who were not taking graft engaged in 
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evidence manipulation. This is supported by evidence from the Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland (Fitzgerald, 1989; 
Herbert & Gilling, 2004). Thus, the reward they sought was job satisfaction. 
The key solution to combatting the incidence of noble cause corruption can be found in the transcripts of the 
police officers themselves. Theyindicated that there was no need for noble cause corruption if they were given the 
means to obtain conclusive evidence, through increased powers and, especially, suitable equipment. A reliance on 
technology should not infringe on civil liberties or lower standards of proof, but insteadit can directly address the 
types of noble cause corruption that arose in the evidence.For example, surveillance that can prove a person is 
dealing, increasestheir chances of being arrested at a time when they have drugs in their possession, thereby 
removing the need to „load up‟ evidence or harass dealers.  
These technological changes could be further supported by better communication with the legal profession and 
the judiciary. Rewards for success may reduce the stigmatisation of police and the social distance between them and 
the community. But police have to accept that they may suffer from confirmation bias(Nickerson, 1998); they may 
convince themselves of someone‟s guilt and, supported by punishment justification and legal affirmation, pursue, 
charge and load up a person under an entirely incorrect presumption. 
In order for police officers to be more inclined to behave in a manner that is consistent with the expectations of 
the police organization, long-term rewards or incentives for not abusing their power must outweigh the benefits 
gained from engaging in corrupt activities (Myerson, 2011).  In this case the incentives to abuse power far 
outweighed the incentives to administer power in a manner consistent with the rules and regulations outlined by the 
police organization. It is particularly important that police organizations develop a judicious mix of punitive 
measures in relation to ruthless intentional corruption, as well as a police culture that is forgiving to those who make 
honest mistakes (Miller, 2003). Enforcement of the law cannot be achieved by individual police officers. Police 
officers need to be collectively responsible and accountable.As Punch (2009) outlines, good policing come from 
sound leadership (at all levels), standards of performance and conduct are clear and that there isa sound structure and 
a culture of accountability is supported and endorsed (Skogan, 1994, Williams, 2002). 
The problem of noble cause corruption in policing illustrates the importance of ongoing ethical discussions, 
training programmes, and especially supervision. Leaders play an integral part forming the overall climate of the 
organization. Corruption cannot exist without the support of the leader; implicitly and explicitly. By tolerating, 
encouraging corruption or failing to administer punishment to individuals who practice corrupt activities can foster 
corruption.Demonstrated in the Wood Royal Commission, leaders do not actually have to engage in corruption to 
serve as role models (e.g. ignoring, rewarding corrupt behaviour). In order to reduce corruption within the police, 
leaders need to send a strong message to all officers within the organization, that corruption will not be tolerated.  
Police leaders also need to be proactive and engage with anti-corruption organizations (e.g. Crime and Corruption 
Commissions, the Courts, etc.)if they are to successfully fight corruption. This fight is not restricted to stakeholders 
directly involved with police corruption; the community can also play a key role by providing unique information 
about where the corruption is occurring.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has contributed to the literature by providing key insights into the nature of noble cause 
corruption and the role of leadership in the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police. The findings 
suggest that officers were motivated to indulge in noble cause corruption through a desire to produce convictions 
where they believed the system unfairly worked against their ability to do their job correctly. In order words, police 
were seeking job satisfaction through the ability to convict the guilty.  The solution lies in the Wood Royal 
Commission itself; police are calling for better equipment and stronger investigative powers. These initiatives along 
with better communication between the police and judicial system can not only reduce the need for noble cause 
corruption, but also potentially lessen the negative perceptions of the system held by the police culture.  
The findings also suggest that officers who engaged in corrupt activities suffered from a failure of 
leadership. Police leaders are role models and do not have to engage in corruption themselves to have an influence 
on other officers.  
 
This paper argues that strong leadership is needed to inhibit their behaviours fromthriving in an occupation 
exposed to opportunities and temptation. Leadership can not only from the top, but from all levels of the police 
organization to continue to demonstrate high levels of integrity.   
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